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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we develop an agent-based model of a market game in order to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the UK government’s 2008-2010 policy on promoting smart 
metering. We also consider possible supplementary strategies. With the model, we test 
the effectiveness of four possible strategy options and suggest their policy 
implications. The context of the paper is a practical application of agent-based 
simulation to the retail electricity market in Britain. The contribution of the research 
are both in the areas of policy making for electricity markets and in the 
methodological use of agent-based simulation for studying social complex systems 
involving human behaviour.  
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the UK government’s most prominent recommendations for the energy market 
is the adoption of smart metering technology, which, in addition to offering a broad 
range of benefits to energy consumers, can substantially cut CO2 emissions. As a 
novel technology, in the UK energy market smart metering is still in its infancy and its 
adoption appears as a long and slow process. The characteristic of uncertainty in 
technology diffusion raises the strategic issue of what policies the government should 
introduce to boost the roll-out of smart meters in the UK energy market. Lessons from 
international experience (e.g. Italy, Sweden and California) suggest that introducing 
smart metering in the context of monopoly provision can be a very successful strategy. 
However, the characteristics of competition and diversification of meter ownership in 
the UK metering market mean that the government faces a different context for policy. 
Therefore, in Feb 2006 the energy market regulatory agency in Britain (Ofgem) 
consulted different stakeholders and proposed six policy options. More recently (May 
2007), the government (the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (BERR)) has announced its policies on promoting smart metering technology 
in of its 2007 white paper on energy Meeting the Energy Challenge. However, how 
effective these policies are in terms of fostering smart metering and what other 
supplementary optimum strategies can be used to strengthen the effectiveness of these 
policies in the UK energy market still remain questionable. This paper is motivated by 
a desire to develop a methodological framework for studying these two inter-related 
research questions.  
 
Traditionally, the adoption of a new technology as a particular form of collective 
behaviour of users occurring in markets or economies has been mainly studied from 
the perspective of management science, e.g. the “S-curve” model [1], the adopter 
heterogeneity model [2], learning or epidemic model [3] and real options model [4, 5]. 
However, recent studies (e.g. [6, 7]) show an individual user decision on choosing an 
innovative product is not only a function of the benefit and cost of the product, as 
described in economic theories, but also, and in some cases perhaps more so, a 
function of the factors from the user’s psychology and the social networks the user 
involves. Yet, these factors in technology diffusion have received very little research. 
In order to bridge this gap, this paper follows up our previous study [8] and targets the 
aforementioned two inter-related research questions, i.e. how effective the 
government’s proposed new smart metering policies would be and what 
supplementary optimum strategies can be adopted to enhance the effectiveness of 
these policies, via an agent-based model developed based on consumer 
psycho-behavioural theory.   
 
The model in this paper is a market game developed based on the situation of the real 
retail electricity market in Britain. This market game represents the interaction 
between electricity suppliers and the residential electricity consumers. Essentially, we 
investigate the effectiveness of BERR’s 2008-2010 policies on promoting smart 
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metering and identify what supplementary optimum strategies can be used to enhance 
the effectiveness of BERR’s new policies in the market game. The objective of the 
study is twofold. Firstly, we expect that the results of the study reported in this paper 
can potentially help stakeholders (especially government policy makers and energy 
suppliers) to take effective measures for boosting the roll-out of smart meters. 
Secondly, we aim to extend the application of agent-based computational simulation 
research method from theoretical to practical, i.e. using agent-based computational 
simulation method to analyse practical problems in the energy market. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section describes the metering 
market in Britain. The third section describes Ofgem’s six policy options and BERR’s 
new policies on promoting smart metering in Britain. The fourth section presents our 
agent-based simulation model of smart metering technology adoption (the market 
game) in detail. The fifth section shows the four scenarios of strategy options we 
simulated with the model. The sixth section focuses on the analysis of the simulation 
results and their policy implications. The seventh section concludes the study.   
 
2. The Retail Electricity Metering Market in Britain 
 
It is a legal requirement that all but a few exempted electricity consumers must have 
an appropriate meter when they use electricity. As a result, currently there are around 
22.5 million domestic electricity meters installed in England and Wales: 3 million 
prepayment meters, 3.3 million multi-tariff meters and 16.2 million single rate credit 
meters [9]. Each year, about 2.2 million meters are installed (out of which 1.2 million 
are new and 1 million are replacement) [10]. Metering services have two core 
components: one is the provision of an accurate meter of an appropriate type, the 
other one is data services (taking meter readings periodically and processing the data). 
However, around 10% domestic electricity meters are prepayment meters. These 
meters allow customers to pre-pay for their electricity use via various means of 
payment such as electronic tokens, keys or payment cards.  
 
Traditionally, the electricity Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) are the dominant 
meter operators for domestic meter points. They have a licence obligation to provide 
metering services to all meter points, upon the request of the relevant electricity 
suppliers. DNOs own and manage the meter assets. They also charge electricity 
suppliers for metering services. The prices they charge electricity suppliers are 
regulated by Ofgem. In March 2001, Ofgem published its metering strategy, aiming to 
introduce competition in the metering market. Following this, full electricity metering 
competition entered into force in 2003. The purpose of introducing competition in 
electricity metering services was to encourage supplier and metering service providers 
to lower prices, improve standards of service and innovate. A key principle of the 
policy of introducing competition in the electricity metering services is to make 
electricity suppliers, not DNOs, primarily responsible for purchasing metering 
services—the so-called “supplier hub” principle [11]. Since then, some electricity 
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suppliers have appointed third-party commercial metering service providers, rather 
than automatically continuing to use existing providers, for providing electricity 
metering services to their domestic consumers. For example, Centrica has appointed 
United Utilities, OnStream and Siemens, three competing commercial metering 
service providers, for the provision of competitive electricity metering services to its 
domestic consumers [11].  
 
Under the current regulatory framework, although domestic electricity consumers 
have the statutory right to make their own metering arrangements few have chosen to 
do so. Currently consumer demand for meter ownership and consumers making their 
own metering arrangements are virtually zero [12]. Moreover, DNOs are still 
responsible for (own and manage) over 90% of domestic electricity meters. The vast 
majority of domestic electricity meters are simple single-phase electro-mechanical or 
electronic meters with either a single register or multiple registers [9]. Therefore, 
these meters can only be read manually on an annual or bi-annual basis. In order to 
prevent fraud, they are generally backstopped so as to prevent them form running 
backwards.  
 
3. Ofgem’s Six Policy Options and BERR’s New Policies on Promoting Smart 
Meters 
 
Ofgem’s Six Policy Options 
 
Currently, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, maintaining security of energy supply 
and tackling fuel poverty are the three of the major challenges in the UK energy 
market. Smarter, more innovative electricity meters (smart metering) can potentially 
help tackle all the three issues [11]. Therefore, as an effective approach to energy 
efficiency, promoting smart metering is at the top of the government’s energy agenda. 
Although competition has already been introduced in the electricity metering market, 
there is little evidence that electricity suppliers intend to introduce smart meters to 
their domestic electricity consumers on a large scale in the next few years [12]. In Feb 
2006, Ofgem published a consultation document Domestic Metering Innovation, 
which marks the launch of a significant Ofgem initiative to work with the energy 
suppliers, the network operators, meter manufacturers, government and other 
stakeholders to help identify and unlock the potential of smart meters. In this 
consultation document, Ofgem proposed six policy options on promoting smart 
meters based on the consideration of the regulatory arrangements, i.e. should the 
introduction of smart meters be left to customers and energy suppliers to decide, or 
mandated, through some form of legislation and/or regulation by relevant authorities. 
The six policy options are as follows. 
 
z Address barriers to innovation 
 
This option emphasizes the effect of competition, leaving the final decision on 
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whether to install smart meters to consumers, suppliers and the market. The 
advantages of this policy option is that the policy option can (i) “leave the technology 
choice in the hands of those best-placed to take the decisions (companies and 
customers)—this would reduce the risk of a “one size fits all” approach and/or 
picking the wrong technology”; (ii) “work with the existing arrangements without 
disturbing companies’ existing plans, contracts and investments and encourage those 
suppliers who are starting to consider innovative metering to continue down that 
road” [11].  
 
z Enable the customer to contract for a smart meter 
 
This is a more radical policy option emphasizing the role of the consumer in 
promoting smart metering. It puts the consumer, rather than the supplier, at the centre 
of the decision of what sort of smart meter they want to have. As consumers have the 
most to gain from smart metering, they might be best placed to choose whether to buy 
a smart meter. This policy option enables consumers to either own the meter, or 
contract directly with a meter provider for the meter or contract through the supplier 
with a meter operator. 
 
z Impose an obligation on suppliers 
 
This policy option highlights the role of the regulator and the government in 
promoting smart metering, based on the lessons learnt from international experience 
such as Sweden [11]. Under this policy option, an obligation could be placed on all 
energy suppliers to install meters with a minimum specification. This could be done 
via either amending suppliers’ licences to impose this requirement by Ofgem or 
legislating directly by the government.  
 
z Re-bundle metering services into networks 
 
This policy option involves re-bundling metering services into DNOs. Under this 
policy option, the DNOs would be re-positioned as monopoly providers for metering 
services. International experience in Italy shows that re-bundling could allow for a 
massive roll-out of smart meters to all domestic consumers [11]. However, monopoly 
DNOs may not be the best companies to deliver smart meters. The reason for 
introducing competition in metering market, at least in part, was that some energy 
suppliers complained of lack of choice, poor service, poor technology choice, high 
costs and high prices when the DNOs had monopoly on metering services [11].  
 
z Await international evidence 
 
This policy option assumes that currently there is not enough evidence on consumer 
response to justify the investing in smart meters. Policy makers (Ofgem and the 
government) should actively monitor the development of smart metering in countries 
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where smart meters have been adopted to look at how consumers are responding. The 
international evidence could then be used to reappraise the case of smart metering in 
Britain.  
 
z Instigate a trial 
 
This policy option assumes that international evidence may not suitable to appraise 
the case of smart metering in Britain, because consumer response to smart metering 
varies according to the specific consumer characteristics, climate and culture of the 
country concerned. Thus, a policy option that Ofgem can make is to facilitate and 
support a large scale trial of smart meters in Britain to gather firm evidence of the 
consumer response. However, any trial would need to run for a minimum of one year, 
and it would also take time to analyse the results of the trial, so the conclusions 
arising from the trial may not be available for another two years. A range of practical 
issues such as “how can we geographically choose trial areas?”, “how would the trial 
be funded?”, “would consumers still be able to switch supplier during the trial?” 
would also appear in the trial. Research into these issues is of particular interest to 
policy makers. In our previous work [8], based on an agent-based model, we have 
already suggested that in a trial choosing initial participating households on a random 
and geographically dispersed basis would potentially be an effective strategy.   
 
BERR’s New Policies on Promoting Smart Meters 
 
Ofgem’s efforts have not been lost on the UK government who set promoting smart 
metering at the top of its energy agenda in order to comply with the EU Energy 
Services Directive, which states that “Member States shall ensure that, in so far as it is 
technically possible, financially reasonable and proportionate in relation to the 
potential energy savings, final customers for electricity, natural gas…are provided 
with competitively priced individual meters that accurately reflect the final customer’s 
actual energy consumption and that provide information on actual time of use” [13]. 
In May 2007, BERR published its latest version of white paper on energy Meeting the 
Energy Challenge, which explicitly demonstrated the government’s ambition in 
promoting smart metering in Britain (excluding Northern Ireland). In this energy 
white paper, BERR announced its new policies on promoting smart meters: (i) an 
expected 10-year plan to roll out smart meters with real-time visual display devices to 
all households and, between 2008-2010, as an interim measure and the first step to 
smart metering, real-time visual display devices will be available free of charge to any 
household that requests one; (ii) consultation on a government mandate for the 
implementation of a requirement for energy suppliers to roll out smart meters to all 
but the smallest business users in Britain and those larger businesses not already 
subject to half hourly metering, advanced and smart metering services, within the next 
five years.  
 
4. Modelling Government Policies on Promoting Smart Metering in Domestic 
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Electricity Markets 
 
4.1 Description of the Model 
 
Since BERR has announced its policies on promoting smart metering in Britain, how 
effective these polices are and what other supplementary optimum strategies can be 
adopted to enhance the effectiveness of these policies still remain questionable. Under 
BERR’s new policies, whilst Ofgem is in favour of “meter competition approach” to 
roll out smart meters, some other stakeholders (e.g. Energywatch), based on an 
analysis of limited evidence from the UK metering market, argue that re-bundling 
metering services to monopoly DNOs would be a more cost-effective approach [14]. 
As current regulatory framework (meter competition and diversified meter ownership) 
in the UK electricity metering market produces little quantitative evidence for 
economists and policy makers to assess the effectiveness of their smart metering 
policies via econometric models, a new research method for coping with this issue is 
helpful. We present research based on agent-based computational simulation method. 
The model targets the aforementioned two inter-related research questions in the paper, 
as an extension of our previous research [8], is an agent-based model developed based 
on psycho-behavioural theory.  
 
The model is a market game involving two parties: residential electricity consumers 
and electricity suppliers. Each party is represented by a type of agent. Thus the model 
has two types of agents: residential consumer agents and electricity supplier agents. 
Similar to the real players in the real electricity market, these agents interact in a 
designed virtual environment in a computer. We formulise and code the policy options, 
carry out experiments in the virtual environment and then observe its system level 
emergent phenomena of the diffusion of real-time visual displays. The simulation 
results can be seen as inferences of the diffusion of real-time visual displays in the 
real retail electricity market. Through comparing different scenarios in the 
experiments and analysing the simulation parameters, we can assess the effectiveness 
of different policy options and identify the supplementary optimum strategies to 
support BERR’s smart metering policies.    
 
4.2 Behaviour of Residential Consumer Agents   
 
As residential consumer agents represent residential electricity consumers 
(households), they are “smart agents” [15] with human intelligent behaviour in terms 
of decision-making in choosing both energy suppliers and smart meters. In the real 
electricity market, an residential electricity consumer gains information about 
electricity suppliers and metering technologies from both its social network (e.g. 
neighbours, friends or colleagues) and energy suppliers (through advertising such as 
TV, the Internet and news reports), processes the information and then makes 
decisions. We have studied the related psycho-social literature (e.g. [16, 17]) and 
empirical investigations (e.g. [18]). The characteristic features of consumers’ 
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decision-making can be summarized as follows: (i) intention is the immediate 
antecedent of an actual behaviour (choose an option); (ii) a persuasive message will 
(both positively or negatively) influence a consumer’s intention to choose an option 
only if it affects either his/her attitude towards the option or his/her perceived social 
pressure to choose the option from important referent individuals or groups such as 
the person's spouse, family, friends or colleagues; (iii) when facing a range of options, 
a consumer is most likely to choose the one that gives him/her the largest intention, 
given that the consumer perceives he/she has the ability to choose the option. These 
points lead us to formulize residential consumer agents’ behaviour based on the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (the TpB model) [19], which is the most influential 
theory in psycho-behavioural science and particularly suited to modelling consumer 
behaviour.  
 
We assume, in the virtual environment, two kinds of interactions can influence an 
ordinary residential consumer agent i to choose option α (whether choosing a 
real-time visual display device or not with a particular electricity supplier agent). One 
kind, in the form of price information of electricity and benefits of smart metering, is 
the interaction between residential consumer agent i and electricity supplier agents. 
The other kind, in the form of word-of-mouth effects and personal influences, is the 
interaction between residential consumer agent i and other residential consumer 
agents. Based on the TpB model , firstly, the interaction between residential consumer 
agent i and a particular electricity supplier agent such as information about electricity 
prices PPαE sent to residential consumer agent i from the electricity supplier agent, can 
influence residential consumer agent i’s attitude towards choosing option α, but its 
influential power is calibrated by residential consumer agent i’s personality trait 
“price sensitivity”. Therefore, residential consumer agent i’s attitude towards 
choosing option α can be formulated as follows: 
 ( )1    αα
EiPi PWA *=
Where:   = residential consumer agent i’s attitude towards choosing option α αiA
        = residential consumer agent i’s personality trait “price sensitivity” iPW
Secondly, the interaction between residential consumer agent i and other residential 
consumer agents, such as a persuasive message or personal influence about option α 
from an important referent residential consumer agent j, can influence residential 
consumer agent i’s subjective norm towards choosing option α, but its influential 
power is calibrated by residential consumer agent i’s motivation to comply with 
residential consumer agent j. Therefore, residential consumer agent i’s subjective 
norm towards choosing option α can be formulated as follows: 
 
 ( )2  ∑==
n
j
jiiji InfWSN
1
)*( αα
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Where:   = residential consumer agent i’s subjective norm toward choosing 
option α 
α
iSN
         = influence from residential consumer agent j to residential consumer     
agent i on choosing option α 
α
jiInf
ijW   = residential consumer agent i’s motivation to comply with residential 
consumer agent j  
 
n   =  the number of other residential consumer agents interacting with 
residential consumer agent i  
 
Thirdly, a range of residential consumer agent i’s demographic attributes or 
environmental factors such as residential consumer agent i’s income, education level, 
government legislations or unexpected events can influence residential consumer 
agent i’s perception of his/her ability (the perceived behavioural control) to choose 
option α. Therefore, these factors can be regarded as control beliefs in the TpB. 
Analogously, the influential power of a control belief about option α, Cαki , is 
calibrated by residential consumer agent i’s related perceived power of the control 
factor PCik. Residential consumer agent i’s perceived behavioural control towards 
choosing option α can be formulated as follows:  
 
 ( )3  ∑==
m
k
kiiki CPCPBC
1
)*( αα
  
Where:  = residential consumer agent i’s perceived behavioural control 
towards choosing option α 
α
iPBC
           m =  the number of control factors  
 
Finally, combining residential consumer agent i’s attitude (equation 1), subjective 
norm (equation 2) and perceived behavioural control (equation 3) towards choosing 
option α, residential consumer agent i’s intention to choose option α can be expressed 
as follows: 
 
  ( )4αααα EiP
n
j
m
k
kiikjiiji PWCPCInfWI *)*()*(
1 1
++=∑ ∑
= =
 
Where:  = residential consumer agent i’s intention to choose option α αiI
When facing a number of options, the one that can give residential consumer agent i 
the greatest intention is his/her preferred one, i.e. his/her final decision on with which 
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energy supplier and whether to choose a real-time visual display device or not. The 
decision-making can be formulated as follows: 
 
Di = max {I1, I2, I3, … Iα } 
 
Where: Di = residential consumer agent i’s final decision 
 
4.3 Behaviour of Electricity Supplier Agents 
 
Electricity supplier agents are business organizations who are competing in the 
electricity market under the economic regulations set by relevant authorities. Market 
reports based on empirical investigations [12] suggest that currently the competition 
between electricity suppliers in the GB electricity market is based primarily on price 
comparison. Hence in our model of market game, the behaviour of an electricity 
supplier agent includes: (i) disseminating its electricity price information to residential 
consumer agents in the virtual environment; (ii) adjusting electricity price each three 
months, based on the variation of its overall market share. The behaviour can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
 
)1( −tEP
α       if t mod 3 ≠ 0 
=)(tEPα  
)1(* −tEPd
α    if t mod 3 = 0 
Where: t = time steps in the simulation 
      d = a parameter for adjusting the electricity price  
 
4.4 The Environment Design 
 
The environment in our model is a virtual system where agents behave and interact in 
a computer. The virtual system in our model of market game is a square lattice of 
62500 cells (250*250) with periodic boundary conditions. Cells can be either blank or 
occupied by residential consumer agents, as shown in Figure 1. The population 
density in the environment can be controlled by a relevant parameter.  
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 Figure 1: The Environment  
Note: In the virtual community, residential consumer agents are randomly populated in the cells (blue or yellow houses), and the 
black areas are unpopulated cells (non-residential areas). Each populated cell just has one residential consumer agents, and the 
number of total residential consumer agents is control by the parameter called “population-density”. The blue houses are the 
residential consumer agents with conventional meters, while yellow houses are the residential consumer agents with smart meters. 
In order to eliminate edge effects, the square lattice has periodic boundary conditions. 
 
Based on related literature in sociology and networking [20, 21, 22, 23] we can 
consider two types of interactions between an residential consumer agent with other 
residential consumer agents: regular interactions and random interactions, as shown in 
Figure 2. This design enables the social networks in the environment to have the 
characteristic features of both “small-world” effect and scale-free power-law 
distribution.  
 
 
 11
  
Figure 2: A residential consumer agent’s regular (blue) and random interactions (red)  
with other residential consumer agents 
Note: In the virtual environment, for example, the dark blue residential consumer agent on the one hand can regularly receive 
influences from and exert influences on its neighbouring residential consumer agents through regular interactions (blue arrows in 
Figure 2) with them, and the number of regular interactions is controlled by a parameter called “radius”. If we make the 
parameter “radius” greater (a longer dashed radius in Figure 2), the dark blue residential consumer agent will have more regular 
interactions. On the other hand, the dark blue residential consumer agent can randomly receive influences from and exert 
influence on other residential consumer agents through random interactions with them (red arrows in Figure 2) and the number of 
random interactions it has is controlled by a parameter called “random-interaction”.  
 
5. The Simulation 
 
BERR’s new policies for promoting smart metering state that between 2008 and 2010 
any household requesting a real-time visual display device can get one free of charge. 
The key issue raised from this policy is that who pays for this device. Based on this 
issue, we further break down the policy into three dimensions: (i) the government 
subsidizes; (ii) electricity suppliers pay for real-time visual displays; (iii) DNOs pay 
for real-time visual displays. Under the three strategies, the next issue is how best to 
roll out real-time visual displays. If the government subsidizes real-time visual display 
devices, these devices can be rolled out in either the context of monopoly (by DNOs) 
or the context of competition (by electricity suppliers); if electricity suppliers pay for 
real-time visual displays devices and are responsible for rolling them out, they will be 
rolled out in the context of competition; if DNOs pay for real-time visual display 
devices and are responsible for rolling them out, they will be rolled out in the context 
of monopoly. Therefore, our model of market game will simulate the scenarios of 
these strategies, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Free Real-time Visual Display  
Device Policy Between 
2008-2010 
The 
Government 
Electricity 
Suppliers 
DNOs 
Who pays? 
Competition Monopoly Competition Monopoly 
How to 
roll out? 
Government Financed 
Competitive Roll Out 
Scenarios 1 
Government Financed 
Monopoly Roll Out 
Scenarios 2 
Electricity Supplier Financed 
Competitive Roll Out 
Scenarios 3 
DNO Financed 
Monopoly Out 
Scenarios 4 
 
Figure 3: Scenarios of strategies in the simulation 
 
We develop six electricity supplier agents representing six main competitors in the 
UK electricity market with the initial market share of each electricity supplier agent 
the same as its counterpart’s market share in the real UK electricity market (Figure 4). 
 
 
F
E
D
C
B
A
Electricity Supplier Agent 
   National market share in electricity (Source: Domestic Retail Market Report, Ofgem, June 2007) 
Figure 4: Electricity supplier agents in the model of market game 
 
We simulate four scenarios of strategies shown in Figure 3. Each time step in the 
model is designed as one month. In all the four scenarios, a residential consumer 
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agent cannot switch electricity supplier agent within two time steps (complying with 
the 28-day rule in real electricity market [12]). Each residential consumer agent has 
been assigned a parameter “enthusiasm” ranging from 0 to 1 to signify the degree to 
which the residential consumer agent is interested in having a real-time visual display. 
In order to assess the effectiveness of different strategies, the four scenarios are under 
the same initial condition shown in Table 1. Because currently competition between 
electricity suppliers in the UK electricity market is based primarily on price 
comparison [12] and, as a result empirical observations from the real UK electricity 
market show a declining trend of annual electricity bills (Figure 5), we adopt a 
declining pattern of electricity prices in our model, i.e. each three month, an 
electricity supplier agent checks its overall market share. If its overall market share is 
declining, it will slightly lower its electricity price in order to attract residential 
consumer agents.  
 
parameter value comments 
number of electricity 
supplier  agents 
6 There are six electricity supplier agents in the virtual community 
 
population-density 0.40 40% of the cells in the virtual community is populated, i.e. there are 
25000 (62500*0.4 = 25000) residential consumer agents in the 
virtual community   
market-share-A 0.22 Initially electricity supplier agent A has 22% market share 
 
market-share-B 0.19 Initially electricity supplier agent B has 19% market share 
 
market-share-C 0.17 Initially electricity supplier agent C has 17% market share 
 
market-share-D 0.16 Initially electricity supplier agent D has 16% market share 
 
market-share-E 0.14 Initially electricity supplier agent E has 14% market share 
 
market-share-F 0.12 Initially electricity supplier agent F has 12% market share 
 
random-interaction 10 Each residential consumer agent has less than 10 random 
interactions in the virtual community 
radius 2 Each residential consumer agent regularly interacts with other 
residential consumer agents within 2 unit radius 
Table 1: The initial conditions of the four scenarios 
 
Scenario 1 (Government Financed-Competitive Roll Out) simulates the strategy that 
the government subsidizes real-time visual display devices and electricity suppliers 
are primarily responsible for rolling out these devices. The simulation in this scenario 
is based on the following principles: (i) the electricity supplier agents are competing 
to gain market share; (ii) as they do not have to undertake the cost of real-time visual 
display devices, they disseminate the information of the free real-time visual display 
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device policy throughout the whole virtual environment and initially residential 
consumer agents with enthusiasm greater than 0.9 will consider requesting these 
devices; (iii) meter competition enables electricity supplier agents to deliver real-time 
visual display devices of different types/functions to residential consumer agents, thus 
residential consumer agents have many options on real-time visual display devices.  
 
Scenario 2 (Government Financed-Monopoly Roll Out) simulates the strategy that the 
government subsidizes real-time visual display devices and DNOs are responsible for 
rolling out these devices. The simulation in Scenario 2 is based on the following 
principles: (i) the electricity supplier agents are competing to gain market share; (ii) as 
they do not have to undertake the cost of real-time visual display devices, they 
disseminate the information of free real-time visual display device policy throughout 
the whole virtual environment and initially residential consumer agents with 
enthusiasm greater than 0.9 will consider requesting these devices; (iii) there is a 
DNO of monopolistic power in the virtual environment; (iv) electricity supplier 
agents instruct the DNO to deploy real-time visual display devices to residential 
consumer agents upon the requests from residential consumer agents; (v) the DNO 
only delivers one selected type of real-time visual display device to residential 
consumer agents, thus residential consumer agents only have one option on real-time 
visual display devices. 
 
Scenario 3 (Electricity Supplier Financed-Competitive Roll Out) simulates the 
strategy that electricity suppliers pay for real-time visual display devices and they are 
also responsible for deploying these devices. The simulation in Scenario 3 is based on 
the following principles: (i) the electricity supplier agents are competing to gain 
market share; (ii) as they have to absorb the cost of real-time visual display devices, 
they are not keen to disseminate the information of the free real-time visual 
display device policy to residential consumer agents,1 thus initially only 
residential consumer agents with enthusiasm greater than 0.98 (i.e. every 
enthusiastic consumers) will consider requesting these devices; (iii) meter 
competition enables electricity supplier agents to deliver real-time visual display 
devices of different types/functions to residential consumer agents, thus residential 
consumer agents have many options on real-time visual display devices.. 
 
 
1 This organisational behaviour has already been witnessed in the wireless telecommunication market. In the wireless 
telecommunication market, one competition policy is that mobile phone customers can retain their existing mobile numbers 
when switching between network operators, the so-called Mobile Number Portability (MNP) policy. Although this policy 
was introduced to the wireless telecommunication market by the Office of Communications (Ofcom) in 1999, up to date 
only a small number of customers know it because network operators are not keen to publicise the policy. One of the key 
reasons for their unwillingness to publicise the MNP policy is that if a customer switches from one network to another 
network and keeps his/her existing mobile number, the recipient network operator will have to pay a charge to the donating 
network operator for the routing of a parted call. This is the so-called the Donor Conveyance Charge (DCC) in the wireless 
telecommunication market. For further information, please see [26]. 
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Scenario 4 (DNO Financed-Monopoly Roll Out) simulates the strategy that DNOs 
pay for real-time visual display devices and they are also responsible for deploying 
these devices. The simulation in Scenario 4 is based on the following principles: (i) 
the electricity supplier agents are competing to gain market share; (ii) as they do not 
have to absorb the cost of real-time visual display devices, they disseminate the 
information of the free real-time visual display device policy throughout the whole 
virtual environment and initially residential consumer agents with enthusiasm greater 
than 0.9 will consider requesting these devices; (iii) there is a DNO of monopolistic 
power in the virtual environment; (iv) electricity supplier agents instruct the DNO to 
deploy real-time visual display devices to residential consumer agents upon the 
requests from residential consumer agents; (v) the DNO only delivers real-time visual 
display devices of minimum specifications (the cheapest type of real-time visual 
display devices) to residential consumer agents, thus residential consumer agents only 
have one option on real-time visual display devices. 
 
6. Simulation Results 
 
As the free real-time visual display device policy lasts only for two years, in the 
simulation we focus on the first 24 months. Through the four simulation experiments 
we observe three interesting emergent phenomena, which may give us 
phenomenological information for assessing the effectiveness of BERR’s new policies 
on promoting smart metering in the real UK electricity market. 
 
Firstly and most importantly, an “S-curve” pattern of technology adoption [1] has 
been reproduced in our model of market game. Figure 6 shows the trends of real-time 
visual display device adoption in the four scenarios all have a common pattern of 
“S-curve”, which complies with our empirical observation from the Telegestore 
Project of promoting smart meters carried out by Enel in Italy (see Figure 7). Figure 6 
can also help us evaluate the effectiveness of the four strategies. From Figure 6 we 
can see that smart metering can be most quickly adopted in Scenario 1 (Government 
Financed-Competitive Roll Out), followed by the adoptions in Scenario 2 
(Government Financed-Monopoly Roll Out), Scenario 4 (DNO Financed-Monopoly 
Roll Out) and Scenario 3 (Electricity Supplier Financed-Competitive Roll Out). Thus 
policy implications from this are: (i) under the free real-time visual display device 
policy, the government subsidizes real-time visual display device is a more effective 
way than that electricity suppliers and DNOs undertake the cost of these devices; (ii) 
if the government subsidizes real-time visual display devices, imposing an obligation 
on electricity suppliers so as to force them roll out these devices through competition 
is a more effective way than rolling out smart meters in the context of monopoly 
through re-bundling metering services to DNOs; (iii) if the government is unable to 
subsidize real-time visual display devices and the cost of these devices has to been 
undertaken by electricity suppliers or DNOs, rolling out these devices in the context 
of monopoly through re-bundling metering services to DNOs is a more effective way 
than rolling out these devices in the context of competition through imposing an 
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obligation to electricity suppliers.  
 
Secondly, a typical “lock-in” effect [24] appears as an emergent phenomenon in the 
simulation. The “lock-in” effect is a very interesting phenomenon in market, referring 
to a state of an evolving market in which consumers prefer one of two or more 
competing products and this preference persists for a long time beyond what would be 
economically rational [25]. The evolutions of electricity supplier agent’s market 
shares in all the four scenarios (Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11) are in 
line with the “lock-in” effect. In the model, although the incumbent initially can take a 
large market share based on its market power, other competitors will soon fight back 
and finally a relatively stable state will appear in the market (see Figure 8, Figure 9, 
Figure 10, and Figure 11). Our empirical observation from the real UK electricity 
market shows that a real “lock-in” effect does indeed exist between the major 
competitors (see Figure 12).   
 
Thirdly, our simulation shows a dynamically unstable state of consumer switching: 
after the introduction of real-time visual display devices, in the early stage a large 
number of residential consumer agents switch electricity supplier agent seeking a 
preferred real-time visual display device; later although a stable state in market share 
(the “lock-in” effect) appears, as a result of competition every month there are still a 
considerable number of residential consumer agents switching electricity supplier 
agents, as shown in Figure 13. This emergent phenomenon precisely complies with 
our empirical observations of consumer switching from the real UK electricity market 
( see Figure 14).  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The issue of what policies and strategies the government and Ofgem should make in 
terms of promoting smart metering in the UK is still an open research question and 
thus a better understanding of the evolutionary process in technology diffusion should 
have important implications on policy making. The latest consultation document 
published by BERR on 29th April 2008 stated that the government will “hold urgent 
discussions with electricity suppliers to assess how displays could best be made 
available to consumers in the short-medium term” [27]. Therefore, at the moment it is 
still not clear that what strategies the UK government will make to promote smart 
metering. An agent-based model of market game is described in this paper and it has 
provided some initial insights for evaluating the government’s new policies on 
promoting smart metering. Our model shows that the government’s free real-time 
visual display device policy in 2008-2010 will be an effective policy on promoting 
smart metering. This policy can be accompanied by some supplementary optimum 
strategies and based on the key issue “who pays for the smart meters” we test the 
effectiveness of four possible strategy options in four scenarios. The policy 
implications from our simulation results can help policy makers figure out the best 
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policies and strategies for promoting smart meters under different conditions. Based 
on the research, the best strategy we would like to suggest is that under the free 
real-time visual display device policy, the government subsidizes the promotion of 
these devices and meanwhile imposing an obligation on electricity suppliers so as to 
force them roll out these devices through competition. 
 
As an extension to our previous research [8], the model of market game presented in 
this paper makes agent-based simulation approach one important step forward from 
theoretical development to practical application. A methodological contribution of this 
model is that it successfully incorporates human psycho-behavioural theory into 
agent-based simulation. Because the behaviour of residential consumer agents in the 
model are based on well-established psycho-behavioural theory and the whole model 
is developed based on empirical observations (e.g. competition results in declining 
electricity prices), the simulation results from our model bear resemblance to the 
phenomena (e.g. the “S-curve” pattern of technology adoption, the “lock-in” effect 
and the dynamically unstable state of consumer switching) as widely observed in the 
real world. This also signifies the validity and robustness of our model. Moreover, this 
model can be seen as a generic reference multi-agent framework for modeling any 
complex social system involving human behaviour.  
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Figure 5: Real annual domestic electricity bill in GB  (Source: Ofgem) 
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Figure 6: The trends of real-time visual display diffusion 
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The "S-curve" Model of Smart Metering Technology Adoption in the
Telegestore Project (Enel, Italy)
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Figure 7: The “S-curve” pattern of smart Metering technology adoption in the Telegestore Project (Data Source: Enel, Italy)   
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Figure 8: Evolution of electricity supplier agent’s market shares in Scenario 1 (Government Financed-Competitive Roll Out)   
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Evolution of Market Share (Scenario 2)
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Figure 9: Evolution of electricity supplier agents’ market shares in Scenario 2 (Government Financed-Monopoly Roll Out) 
 
 
 
Evolution of Market Share (Scenario 3)
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Figure 10: Evolution of electricity supplier agents’ market shares in Scenario 3 (Electricity Supplier Financed-Competitive Roll Out) 
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Evolution of Market Share (Scenario 4)
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Figure 11: Evolution of electricity supplier agents’ market shares in Scenario 4 (DNO Financed-Monopoly Roll Out) 
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Figure 12: The “Lock-in” Effect in the UK Electricity Market (Data Source: Domestic Retail Market Report, Ofgem, June 2007) 
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Figure 13: Monthly residential consumer agent transfer flows 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Monthly transfer flows in the real UK electricity market (Data Source: Domestic Retail Market Report, Ofgem, 2005) 
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